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THE CRIME WAR. By Robert M. Cipes. New York: World. 1968. 
Pp. xiv, 207. $5.50. 
I. THE WAR THEORY OF CRIME CONTROL 
To those who insist that our society is waging a "war on crime," 
Robert Cipes' book, The Crime War, may be considered treason. 
His purpose is to show "some of the short-range consequences and 
the long-range dangers" (p. xi) of the war theory of crime control,1 
1. The idea that society must wage a "war" against crime is an old concept which 
entails many implicit assumptions about how the criminal should be treated. In a 
recent article, Do Police Sometimes Practice "Civil Disobedience" Too?, TRIAL, Oct.-
Nov. 1968, at 15, Professor Yale Kamisar, a consistent opponent of the war theory, 
cited the following passage from E. HOPKINS, OUR LAWLESS PouCE 319 (1931) as "the 
most incisive description" of the theory: 
Being the enemy, he [the criminal, or more accurately, the persons accused or 
suspected of crime] has no rights worthy of the name. He is to be met by the 
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and his method is a forthright attack on the foundation of that 
theory. In the rebellious tone of a man who is fed up with propa-
ganda, Cipes rejects the popular notion that the criminal is the 
"enemy" and shifts his focus from the "psychology and morals of 
the so-called criminal to the psychology and ·morals of those who 
have been set up to prosecute, judge, and punish him" (p. xi). He 
argues that the use of war terminology infuses the administration 
of criminal justice with a war psychosis which results in the loss of 
important civil liberties.2 Moreover, he seeks to prove that the con-
cept of a "war" is based entirely upon false assumptions about the 
nature and extent of crime-assumptions which he contends were 
deliberately created by self-seeking politicians, prosecutors, news-
papermen, and law enforcement officials. The Crime J,Var is an am-
bitious attempt to neutralize the massive pro-war publicity which 
has been successful in molding the public's attitude toward crime. 
In our fear-charged times, the strong voice of one who has not 
lost sight of libertarian goals is essential. However, the measure of 
Cipes' contribution must be found not in his courage but in his 
ability to persuade the public that the simplistic solutions offered 
by the warmongers are unjustified and misconceived. My own 
view is that The Crime War will not have a substantial impact 
on public attitudes toward crime control because it relies too 
heavily upon minimization of the crime problem as a means of 
reducing the attractiveness of oppressive police tactics. 
It is probably true that the American public is virtually para-
noid about crime; yet whether or not this paranoia is justified by 
the facts is irrelevant. As Dean Francis Allen of the University of 
Michigan Law School has stated: 
The stark and inescapable fact is that the feeling of security has 
suffered serious erosion in American society; and perhaps the most 
weapons of war. Individual rights, including those of non-combatants, are subject 
to invasion like the rights of non-combatants in wartime. The policeman is a 
peacetime soldier. If bullets go astray, if civilians are inconvenienced, if civil 
rights are suspended, those are accidents inherent in a warfare that is waged in 
crowded cities. Criminologists of the humanitarian class are to be scorned, be-
cause they are the Pacifists in this war. Defense attorneys are to be frustrated 
and outwitted because they are the enemy's diplomatic corps. Critizens who 
would make objection to the excess of authority indulged in for the protection 
of the public are giving aid and comfort to the enemy. If the Constitution for-
bids internal war, then the Constitution is technical and pettifogging, and for its 
own good it must be protected against itself. Its makers in any case could not 
have foreseen the pass to which this war has come. The law of war is the law of 
necessity. There are certain rules of war, but they do not strictly bind, and atroc-
ities are only to be deprecated because they may become public and hurt the 
cause-not because the enemy is entitled to the least consideration. 
2. Cf. Goldberg, Can We Afford Liberty?, 117 U. PA. L. REv. 665 (1969), in which 
in the attempt to find solutions to the problem "has led to drastic measures; among 
them have been various proposals to amend the Constitution or legislatively overrule 
recent Supreme Court interpretations of it •••• " 
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significant consideration is this sense of insecurity, whatever reality 
a valid statistical analysis might reveal. As insecurity has increased, 
indignation has intensified: hence the mounting denunciations of 
lawlessness and demands for its forcible repression.3 
Thus, I am afraid that, while Cipes may be quite right in asserting 
that public fear of crime is excessive and unrealistic, reinterpreta-
tion of the crime statistics will not change the minds of those who 
"know" that they are not safe in a subway, underground garage, or 
public park. In short, The Crime War is the kind of book that is 
likely to cause those who already agree with the author to nod know-
ingly while those who disagree will dismiss it as liberal claptrap. 
The primary thrust of the book is an assertion that the "crime 
crisis" which is at the root of the war theory is the result of an 
exaggerated view of the crime problem. "If a real emergency exists," 
the author states, "the authorities must adopt emergency measures 
to deal with it. But if in fact there is no crime wave, then there 
would be no justification in suspending civil liberties, in increasing 
powers of the police and the destructiveness of their weapons, nor 
any necessity for escalating punishments and tightening security 
over convicted offenders" (p. 4).4 With this reasoning as a basic 
premise, Cipes assigns himself the task of persuading the public that 
there is no crisis and that therefore no extraordinary powers are 
needed.5 
3. Statement Before the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of 
Violence, Washington, D.C., Oct. 30, 1968, reprinted in 12 I.Aw QUADRANGLE NOTES, 
Fall 1968, at 5, 6 (University of Michigan publication). Dean Allen's view seems to be 
reflected in the Progress Report of the Commission according to Drew Pearson who 
quotes the unpublished report as follows: "The intricacies of crime statistics have 
little meaning for the average citizen ...• He appears less impressed with numbers 
and rates and trends than with the fact that there seem to be increasingly large 
sections of his city where he cannot walk safely even in daylight, much less at 
night •..• " Detroit Free Press, Jan. 28, 1969, at II-A, col. 1. 
4. Professor Warren Lehman makes a similar point: 
All the rhetoric of the Great Society aside, it is a rather different thing to 
assert that as a society we have fallen away from standards that had been earlier 
attained than to assert that we must become suddenly, say, twenty-five per 
cent better than we ever have been before to solve the crime problem. The 
possibility of return to a previous height is a little less problematical than 
that of achieving a height not before attained. . . . If • • • it is true that we are 
getting worse, that in prosperous middle age our national morality has come un-
hinged, we could conceivably decide that we want to be saved from ourselves 
regardless of the cost in otherwise unpalatably efficient and professional policing, 
distasteful invasion of privacy, and inhuman remorselessness in prosecution. 
Lehman, Crime, the Public, and the Crime Commission: A Critical Review of the 
Challenge of Crime in a Free Society, 66 MICH. L. REv. 1487, 1514 (1968). This posi-
tion concedes too much. It implicitly suggests that the granting of extraordinary police 
powers would be justified if there were a bona fide crime crisis. Whether or not there 
is a crisis, there will always be a substantial interest in preventing the use of police• 
state techniques, and each proposal must be carefully studied to determines its 
long-range effects upon society as well as its short-range efficiency. Moreover, Cipes' 
statement quoted in the text appears to assume the utility of suspending civil liberties, 
increasing police powers, and escalating punishments in time of emergency. 
5. This tactic seems to be the instinctive response of those who seek to protect 
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II. CRIME CRISIS STATISTICS 
In disputing the assertion that we are in the midst of a crime 
crisis, Cipes relies heavily upon the Report of the President's Crime 
Commission.6 He emphasizes that the statistics contained in that 
report reflect more sophisticated data collection techniques than 
were previously available, an increased willingness of victims to re-
port crime, the growing proportion of juveniles in the population 
(traditionally the largest per capita source of crime), and the increas-
ing trend toward urbanization.7 This analysis is designed to demon-
strate two points: (1) that crime has not increased nearly as much as 
the statistics indicate; and (2) that the actual increase in crime is due 
to normal population growth and redistribution patterns rather 
than to a change in societal standards. Although this approach puts 
the crime problem in a more accurate perspective, 8 it does little to 
assuage the growing public fear created by the demonstrable in-
crease in crime. Moreover, according to the Crime Commission, 
these factors do not account for much more than half of the increase.9 
Cipes points out that the figures indicating a massive rise in 
crime do not justify the panic they have engendered because a care-
ful analysis of victims shows that the risk of being subjected to a 
violent crime occurs in patterns which tend to exclude the very 
persons who are most sensitive and vocal about their fears. It is the 
white suburbanite who makes the loudest demands for police pro-
the criminal justice system from unwarranted attacks based on fear. As early as 1926, 
Clarence Darrow publicly disputed allegations that crime was out of hand by making 
a thorough analysis of the "fallacious" basis of the crime wave theory. Darrow, Crime 
and the Alarmists, HARPER'S MAGAZINE, Oct. 1926, at 535. More recently, Profes-
sor Kamisar utilized the same approach in a series of articles and lectures: Public 
Safety v. Individual Liberties: Some "Facts" and "Theories", 53 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 
171 (1962); On the Tactics of Police-Prosecution Oriented Critics of the Courts, 49 
CORNELL L.Q. 436 (1964); JVhen the Cops Were Not Handcuffed", N.Y. Times, Nov. 7, 
1965, § 6 (Magazine), at 34. See also Bell, What Crime Wave?, FORTUNE, Jan. 1955, at 
96; Cook, There's Always a Crime Wave-How Bad Is This One?, N.Y. Times, Oct. 6, 
1968, § 6 (Magazine), at 38. 
6. PREsIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, 
THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY (1967) [hereinafter REPORT]. 
7. Judge George Edwards of the Sixth Circuit (former Police Commissioner of the 
City of Detroit) attributes the increase in crime to "increasing urbanization of our 
country; the increasing insistence of the United States Supreme Court on strict com-
pliance by the police with the principles of the Bill of Rights; the vast and continu-
ing migration of millions of Negro citizens, principally from southern rural areas to 
the great metropolitan centers; and the civil rights revolution of the 1960's .•.. " 
Edwards, Order and Civil Liberties: A Complex Role for the Police, 64 MICH. L. REv. 
47, 48 (1965). 
8. Chief Justice Roger J. Traynor of the California Supreme Court has emphasized 
the need for such a perspective: "'We may never reach a definitive consensus on the 
interpretation of crime statistics enveloped in so complicated a background. Neverthe-
less we have a responsibility at least to read the statistics in the perspective of correla-
tive data.'' Traynor, Lawbreakers, Courts, and Law-Abiders, 31 Mo. L. REV. 181, 185 
(1966). 
9. REPORT 29. 
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tection; yet the slum dweller is much more likely than he is to be 
the victim of a violent crime.10 The persons who suffer at the hands 
of the violent criminal are also predominantly black; a Negro man 
in Chicago, for example, assumes nearly six times the risk of being 
subjected to an aggravated assault as a white man, while a Negro 
woman is eight times more likely to be assaulted than her white 
counterpart.11 In addition, the likelihood of being attacked by a 
stranger is substantially less than the statistics might suggest because 
the "risk of serious attack from spouses, family members, friends, or 
acquaintances is almost twice as great as it is from strangers on the 
street. "12 
There are times, however, when Cipes' assertions strain credi-
bility. For example, he states that "[d]espite popular assumption 
individual violence in American life is declining. But not the ten-
dency toward collective violence" (p. xii). Although it is not clear 
just what he means by "collective violence," there seems to be very 
little support for this statement under any interpretation. Violence 
in all forms is increasing, whether it is committed by the political 
assassin,13 the street corner hoodlum,14 the militant demonstrator,115 
10. REPORT 19; Edwards, supra note 7, at 52-53; Norris, Constitutional Law En• 
forcement Is Efjective Law Enforcement: Toward a Concept of Police in a Democracy 
and a Citizens' Advisory Board, 43 U. DET. L.J. 203, 214 (1965). 
11. REPoRT 40. Pressure is mounting for law enforcement officials to provide more 
effective protection in ghetto areas, which are increasingly beseiged by crime. In the 
Watts district of Los Angeles, California, 2,000 residents petitioned the city for better 
protection. Tu.rE, Oct. 4, 1968, at 24. A report by the Anti-Crime Committee of the 
New York NAACP advocates "the use of whatever force is necessary to stop a crime or 
to apprehend a criminal." 4 CRIM. L. REP. 2269 (Dec. 25, 1968). A similar demand for 
better law enforcement in inner-city areas was made manifest several years ago dur-
ing a meeting of citizens and police at the tenth precinct in Detroit ["the most diffi-
cult area to patrol in the city" (Edwards, supra note 7, at 61)): "During the course 
of this entire meeting, there was not one complaint about police discrimination or 
brutality. In fact, these residents were asking for stricter enforcement measures in 
their particular block or neighborhood, rather than wanting to have the police re-
moved." Id. 
12. REPORT 19. 
13. In addition to the assassinations of Senator Robert F. Kennedy and the Rev-
erend Martin Luther King, which occurred after Cipes completed his book, the 
assassinations of President John F. Kennedy, Black Nationalist Malcolm X, and 
American Nazi Party leader George Lincoln Rockwell undoubtedly have had signifi-
cant impact upon public attitudes toward violence in this decade. 
14. The President's Crime Commission reported that "about one-half of all rob-
beries are street robberies, and slightly more than one-half involve weapons." REPORT 
18. It also revealed that of 297 robberies surveyed in Washington, D.C., injury was 
inflicted in twenty-five per cent of them. Id. at 19. In 1967, seventy-six police officers 
were killed in the line of duty; the national average from 1960 to 1966 was forty-eight 
per year. FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, UNIFORM CRIME R.EPORTS-1967, at 47 
(1968). Almost fourteen of every one hundred police officers (an eleven per cent 
increase over 1966) were assaulted during 1967. Id. at 50. 
15. During the 1968 Democratic Convention in Chicago, there were reports of 
demonstrators armed with such weapons as razor blades, spiked cork balls, knives, 
and ice picks. Although many of these reports were unconfirmed, there is no doubt 
that some demonstrators were armed and did engage in violent attacks on the police. 
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or the frustrated policeman.16 The ugly fact is that violence breeds 
violence, and the social and political unrest in this country has 
provided a fertile breeding ground. 
In pursuing his thesis that the danger of violent crime is mini-
mal, Cipes points out that "[t]he homicide rate has actually declined 
over the past thirty years. The risk of death from murder is one 
out of twenty thousand, about the same as the risk of drowning. 
The chances of being killed in an accidental fall are twice as great 
as those of being murdered, and the chances of being killed in a car 
accident are more than four times greater" (p. 5). Using this fact as 
support, he concludes that the Crime Commission's Report "demol-
ishes the premise that we are in the midst of a crime wave" (p. 5). 
This argument borders on sophistry and is at best an egregious over-
statement of the Commission's findings. The Report clearly states 
that "there is reason to be alarmed about crime. In fact, just be-
cause crime is alarming, those discussing it-and many people must 
discuss it often if it is ever to be controlled-have an obligation to 
be cool, factual, and precise."17 The Crime Commission also asserts 
that "the likelihood of a serious personal attack on any American 
in any given year is about I in 550"18 and that since 1940 "[t]he 
number of offenses per 100,000 population has tripled for forcible 
rape and has doubled for aggravated assault .... The over-all rate 
for violent crimes, primarily due to the increased rate for aggravated 
assault, now stands at its highest point, well above what it has been 
throughout most of the period.''19 
Nevertheless, in spite of the fact that the public's fears are 
largely based upon an unrealistic assessment of the dangers, they 
are deeply ingrained within the American psyche. Allaying such 
fears, if that is possible, would require a confrontation with the 
real as well as the imagined notions about crime. Unfortunately, 
Cipes seems insensitive to the non-rational nature of the reflex 
toward self preservation which may run counter to logic and rea-
son. Consequently, he relies too heavily upon glib attacks on crime 
RIGHTS IN CONFLicr: REPORT TO THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES .AND PRE• 
VENTION OF VIOLENCE s-4 (1968) (Walker Report). 
16. The disorders accompanying the 1968 Democratic Convention are perhaps the 
clearest example of unmitigated police violence; the conduct of the Chicago police 
was described as "unrestrained and indiscriminate police violence." Id. at vii. Another 
example is the actions of the Law Enforcement Group, made up mostly of New 
York City policemen. About 150 of them "attacked a group of Black Panthers and 
white sympathizers" in the Brooklyn Criminal Courts building. N.Y. Times, Sept. 5, 
1968, at 1, col. 2. See generally P. CHEVIGNY, POLICE POWER-POLICE .ABUSES IN NEW 
YORK CITY (1969); E. CRAY, THE BIG BLUE LINE: POLICE POWER vs. HUMAN RIGHTS 
(1967). 
17. REPORT 49. 
18. Id. at 19. 
19. Id. at 23. 
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statistics and those who compile them.20 Even if Cipes' statistical 
analysis is accepted, the demand for a drastic revision of our crimi-
nal system would remain. Regardless of the reasons, crime today 
is widespread and very visible. As a result, it has become clear to 
the average citizen that his society is not as safe as it should be. If 
he believes that the repressive proposals of the hawks will provide 
greater safety, he may wish to adopt them without consideration of 
the problem of assessing the precise dimensions of the threat. 
Thus, to a safety-conscious society tangible signs of protection are 
far more important than rational analysis. 
Finally, Cipes' argument that the alleged crime crisis is only 
an illusion created by statistical manipulation21 is not persuasive. 
I am aware of the astounding penchant of police and prosecutors 
to find a crime wave whenever they seek to maintain their powers. 
There has never been a time in our history when someone has not 
seen the specter of rampant crime.22 Indeed, the police, J. Edgar 
Hoover included, have cried "wolf" and predicted doom so many 
times that one cannot help but be suspicious of their present cries 
for more power under the same banner. Yet it is one thing to 
recognize law enforcement officials as false prophets, and quite 
another to conclude that the "wolf" does not exist. With a pasture 
full of slaughtered sheep the testimony of the shepherd is superfluous. 
It is easy to understand why civil libertarians are reluctant to 
20. At one point he argues, with some persuasion, that J. Edgar Hoover's control 
of crime statistics has, "as much as any other factor . • . accounted for his phe-
nomenal dominance of American law enforcement" (p. 8). 
21. See text accompanying notes 9-19 supra. 
22. See Kamisar, When the Cops Were Not "Handcuffed", supra note 5. Justice 
Traynor recently reviewed the history of alannism over crime: 
Since the early days of the Republic alarmists have described the crime of their 
day as a wave, without any reminder that where there's a wave there's an 
ocean ..•. 
Generation after generation the waves of crime went on pounding. The 
nineteenth century was no less violent than the eighteenth. In the relatively 
tranquil years of the early twentieth century, still tinged with mauve, crime 
regularly made headlines to break the peace. World War I came and went, but 
crime continued. The years of Prohibition from 1920 to 1933 put criminals in 
business and brought home the sorry lesson that crime pays when it consists of 
supplying prohibited goods or services to self-styled law-abiding citizens. When 
the era of Prohibition ended crime continued, highlighted now by the dubious 
activities of those who had flourished on a law that purported law-abiders 
mocked. They were now as well able as the latter to hire legal counsel and 
they became the first-class citizens of crime, paying for buffer lawyers to counter 
police and prosecutors as no penniless or ignorant wretch could do. Another 
generation would pass before we recognized a right to counsel for all, and even 
then it took additional litigation to extend it to appeals. 
Meanwhile the depression thirties came and went, and crime continued. 
World ·war II came and went, the Korean War came and went, and crime con-
tinued. The fifties ushered in the beginnings of an affiuent society, but not the 
end of crime. We learned that it attended affiuence as it had attended depression 
and the years of so-called normalcy. 
In the sixties we have soared in circles beyond the earth and travelled in 
circles around the earth, but we have not put down crime at home. 
Traynor, supra note 8, at 185-87. 
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admit that some drastic revisions of our criminal system may be 
necessary to cope with increasing crime. They know only too well 
that their admissions will be used against them by many dedicated 
crime fighters. Every concession will be repeated, exaggerated, and 
interpolated for the "cause." Nevertheless, it would be even more 
undesirable to deny the existence of a "crime crisis," because such 
a denial attacks the validity of the public's sincere apprehensions 
and creates a substantial credibility gap between the advocates of a 
calm and rational approach to the problem and the people whom 
they would like to convince. It may be wiser to run the risk of being 
quoted out of context than to create such alienation. 
The question is really one of tactics. Can an advocate of civil 
liberties concede that the crime problem is in danger of getting out 
of control without undercutting his arguments that the criminal sus-
pect ought to be afforded extensive safeguards even at the cost of re-
leasing guilty men? Since the ultimate decision as to how our crimi-
nal system functions is based not on logical necessity but on value 
judgments, "law and order" fanatics may seize upon the premise 
granted them and conclude that we must halt the march of crime at 
any cost.23 What is more, they may be able to convince the public of 
the "need" for greater police powers. But the prospect of misinter-
pretation cannot justify an attempt to mislead the public from view-
ing the situation in its true perspective. As a nation we must decide 
how we are going to deal with the growing malignancy of crime.24 It 
is a decision of immense importance to the structure of our society 
and it should not be made solely by "enlightened civil libertarians" 
seeking social improvement any more than it should be made solely 
by the police. 
The temple of criminal justice, though incomplete, now pro-
vides a meaningful sanctuary from arbitrary, abusive, and unreason-
able treatment; it was built from stones which were wrested one 
by one from men without compassion for civil liberties. It is a 
structure worthy of pride and staunch defense.25 I do not believe, 
23. Justice Goldberg, who believes that "[w]e are justifiably concerned with crime," 
sees the greater danger to be to lessen the safeguards of the criminal suspect, for 
"the power of the criminal is nothing compared to the power of the state .... ·we 
should not rush to abandon our autonomy as individuals just because it creates in-
efficiencies in the apprehension of criminals. Goldberg, supra note 2, at 673-74. 
24. Michael Murphy, former Police Commissioner of New York City, recognized 
the danger of a crime war atmosphere. He has adopted President Johnson's conclusion 
that "[w]e are not prepared in our democratic system to pay for improved law enforce-
ment by unreasonable limitations on the individual protections which ennoble our 
system. • • ." The Supreme Court's Decisions on Defendants' Rights and Criminal 
Procedures, 39 F.R.D. 423, 425 (1966). 
25. That this structure has been built to withstand the inevitable public demands 
for vengeance should be obvious to students of history. Arthur Goldberg has illus-
trated this point: "But the people of this new nation would not accept a constitution 
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however, that the way to defend it is to divert the public's attention 
from its existence. If we do not persuade the people that the present 
structure should be maintained and strengthened, decades of pains-
taking construction can be destroyed as easily as a matchstick castle 
can be crushed by a well-meaning child. It seems to me that the civil 
libertarian's major task is to educate the child, not to trick it. 
III. THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL LAW 
Following his discussion of the amount of crime in America, 
Cipes offers a rather loosely connected series of essays on various 
aspects of the administration of the criminal law. In most of these 
essays he articulates the familiar liberal criticisms of our manifestly 
deficient system; but his chapters on Miranda and the police estab-
lishment raise particularly important issues which merit further 
examination. 
A. "The Meanings of Miranda" 
Although it may be impossible to convince the public that there 
is no crime crisis, it is not so difficult to demonstrate that salvation 
does not lie in unrestrained police power. Unfortunately, The 
Crime War does not develop this theme. This is a most distressing 
omission because many lessons can be learned from an examination 
of a period during which the police were given a free hand in com-
batting crime. In 1933, for example, most states placed no restric-
tions on the use of illegally seized evidence and consequently the 
search warrant was virtually unknown.26 Two years earlier, the 
Wickersham Commission disclosed that prevailing "interrogation 
methods" included application of a rubber hose to the pit of the 
stomach or a phone book to the side of the head.27 Moreover, there 
was no prohibition on the use of coerced confessions28 and an indi-
without a Bill of Rights, for they recognized there would be temporary passions, 
passing emergencies, and apparent changes of circumstances, any of which might 
appear to justify abridgement of individual liberty." Goldberg, supra note 2, at 666. 
26. Kamisar, On the Tactics of Police-Prosecution Oriented Critics of the Courts, 
supra note 5, at 441-42. 
27. In 1931 the Commission reported that "the third degree-that is, the use of 
physical brutality, or other forms of cruelty, to obtain involuntary confessions or 
admissions-is widespread." NATIONAL COMMISSION ON LAW OBSERVANCE AND ENFORCE-
MENT, REPORT No. 11, REPORT ON LAWLESSNESS IN LAW ENFORCEMENT 4 (1931). Cf. 
Traynor, supra note 8, at 204: "[!]hose who equate due process rules with coddling 
of criminals have failed dismally to explain why crime flourishes even when there is 
not such so-called coddling, even when there is evidence of the very opposite." 
28. The exclusion of the first coerced confession was not until 1936 when the 
Supreme Court reversed a conviction based on a confession extracted by pure physi-
cal violence. Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278. 
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gent defendant was entitled to appointed counsel only in capital 
cases. 29 According to the present war theorists, then, there should 
have been less crime in that era since the police were apparently un-
hindered by the courts, and what crime there was should have been 
under control. Yet, in 1933 a Michigan Supreme Court Justice wrote: 
"The wave of crime which is sweeping over this country is causing 
much alarm to law-abiding people. No banker, business man or 
householder seems immune from attack by the burglar, nor is any 
man, woman or child, when upon the streets, free from the danger 
of being kidnapped or robbed."30 Another justice echoed this state-
ment of despair and made the now-familiar assertion that the solu-
tion could be found "if the hands of the police are unshackled and 
if the powers that be will assure them of backing and support."31 In 
this context, attacks on recent Supreme Court decisions as a major 
source of the increase in crime32 are revealed as lame excuses for a 
historic inability to control criminality.33 
When the Court announced in 1"\1iranda v. Arizona34 that a sus-
pect in custody could not be interrogated by the police unless he 
29. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932). 
llO. People v. Stein, 265 Mich. 610, 616, 251 N.W. 788, 790 (1933) Q'ustice Sharpe, 
dissenting). In interesting contrast to this position, David A. Pine, a member of the 
District of Columbia Crime Commission, reveals a less sinister recollection of that 
period: "That there are other causes would seem to be supported by history. I remem-
ber that during the dark days of the Great Depression in the early 1930s there existed 
over the land abject poverty, distress and misery, but I do not recall at that time 
that there was a vast upsurge in crime." PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON CRIME IN THE 
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, REPORT 870 (1966) (minority report of David A. Pine). 
lll. People v. Stein, 265 Mich. 610, 626, 251 N.W. 788, 793 (1933) Q'ustice Weadock, 
dissenting); l'REsIDENT0S COMMISSION ON CRIME IN THE DISTRICT OF GoLUMBIA, REPORT 
at 870. 
82. Moreover, this attack has not been limited to the United States Supreme Court. 
The now familiar complaint that appellate courts look for error and not justice has 
been applied to lower courts as well. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON CRIME IN THE DIS-
TRICT OF COLUMBIA, REPORT 872 (minority report of David A. Pine). 
88. Professor Kamisar makes this point rather emphatically: 
When police-prosecution spokesmen of our day exclaim that "crime is over-
whelming our society," I am reminded of a story, apocryphal no doubt, about a 
certain aging promiscuous actress. When asked what she would do if she could 
live her life all over again, she is said to have replied: "The same thing-with 
different people." 
I venture to say that today too many law-enforcement spokesmen are doing 
"the same thing-with different people." They are u~ing different cases and dif-
ferent crime statistics and they are concentrating on a different target-the 
Supreme Court of the United States rather than the state courts, parole boards, 
social workers, and "shyster lawyers"-but they are reacting the same way they 
reacted in past generations. 
When Wasn't There a "Crime Crisis"?, 39 F.R.D. 450, 455 (1966). Abe Krash, a mem-
ber of the District of Columbia Crime Commission, pointed out one obvious problem 
with this approach: "[l]t diverts attention and energy from appropriate remedial 
measures." PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON CRIME IN THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, REPORT 
924 (Commissioner Krash, joined by Commissioners Ferguson, Lawson &: Wald). 
84. 384 U.S. 486 (1966). 
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was first informed of and had waived his rights to remain silent and 
to have an attorney present, the outcry from law enforcement of-
ficials was instantaneous.35 They claimed that this ruling would 
cripple the police and eliminate the use of confessions.36 Although 
Cipes devotes a full chapter to Miranda and does a good job of 
explaining it to the layman, he never refutes this contention with 
the evidence gathered in studies by the Los Angeles District Attor-
ney's Oflice37 and by the Yale Law Journal38-both of which demon-
strate that the hysterical denunciations reflected groundless fears.30 
Furthermore, to set the record straight, Cipes should have 
pointed out that the Warren Court has not been a "criminal's 
court."40 In Terry v. Ohio,41 for example, the Court approved the 
police's zealously sought power to "stop and frisk" a suspect on less 
than probable cause. In Hoffa v. United States42 it upheld the right 
of the police to plant an informant in a suspect's quarters, and in 
Osborn v. United States43 it allowed such an informant to tape re-
cord a private conversation. Moreover, the Court has protected the 
"anonymity of an informer"44 and the right of the police to extract 
blood samples over a suspect's protest,45 or from an unconscious 
35. There was a similar outcry when the Supreme Court announced the Escobedo 
rule: "[I]t is time we gave ..• [the police] some weapons by which they can try and 
safeguard the honest citizens which is the purpose of the entire police force." Hear-
ings Before the Senate Comm. on the District of Columbia, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 
47 (1965), cited in Traynor, supra note 8, at 197 n.60. 
36. As Arthur Goldberg pointed out in his University of Pennsylvania lecture, even 
if the number of confessions were reduced, "[the critics] offer no evidence that limit-
ing the fifth amendment would substantially reduce crime." Goldberg, supra note 2, 
at 669. 
37. E. Younger, "Results of Survey Conducted in the District Attorney'& Office of 
Los Angeles County Regarding the Effects of the Dorado and Miranda Decisions upon 
the Prosecution of Felony Cases," Aug. 4, 1966. 
38. Project-Interrogation in New Haven: The Impact of Miranda, 76 YALE L.J. 
1519 (1967). Another recently published study corroborates the Yale findings: Medalie, 
Zeitz, &: Alexander, Custodial Police Interrogation in Our Nation's Capital: The At-
tempt To Implement Miranda, 66 MICH. L. REv. 1347 (1968). 
39. Justice Traynor commented on the hue and cry after the Escobedo decision, 
stating: "Anyone who did take a panoramic view was bound to note that virtually 
no one had actually seen policemen in handcuffs. Anyone who followed their activi-
ties closely knew that they were still quite able to handcuff others and that they did 
so when necessary." Traynor, supra note 8, at 198. 
Commissioner Krash has made a similar point: "I know of no empirical study-
which lends support to the conclusion that judicial decisions contribute to the initial 
"decisions by offenders to commit a crime." Pru:smENT's COMMISSION ON CRIME IN TIIE 
DISTRICT OF Coun.mIA, REPORT 925 (Commissioner Krash, joined by Commissioners 
Ferguson, Lawson, &: Wald). 
40. See Kamisar, supra note 1, at 15; Pye, The Warren Court and Criminal Pro• 
cedure, 67 MICH. L. REv. 249 (1968). 
41. 392 U .s. 1 (1968). 
42. 385 U.S. 293 (1966). 
43. 385 U.S. 323 (1966). 
44. McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300 (1967). 
45. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966). 
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person.46 Finally, in Warden v. Hayden47 the Court reversed a long-
standing proscription against the seizure of "mere evidence."48 
B. "Another Look at the Enemies Within" 
Beginning this chapter with a famous quotation from Justice 
Louis Braideis, Cipes lashes out against improper police conduct: 
"If the Government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt 
for law .... To declare that in the administration of the criminal 
law the end justifies the means-to declare that the Government 
may commit crimes in order to secure the conviction of a private 
criminal-would bring terrible retribution" (p. 109).49 Cipes does 
not move, however, from this initial statement into a general 
attack on police lawlessness. This is unfortunate, since the prob-
lem of police lawlessness is at the heart of the dispute between the 
hawks and the doves of the crime war.50 The militarists claim 
that they cannot eradicate crime if they are restrained by naive 
civilian notions of justice,51 while the doves assert that the issues 
46. Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432 (1957). 
47. 387 U.S. 294 (1967). 
48. One further point as to the adverse effect of Supreme Court decisions is 
worth noting: 
The fact of life is that so many law enforcement officers disregard or cir-
cumvent "liberal" Supreme Court decisions and so many lower courts distinguish, 
contain or shrink these decisions down that the so-called "revolution" in con-
stitutional-criminal procedure may more realistically be seen as a process of 
reaction and counter-reaction. 
Address of Professor Yale Kamisar, Mythology and Reality About Crime and the 
Courts, Marshall Wood Lecture Series on Crime in America, Brown University, 
Nov. I, 1967. 
49. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928) (Justice Brandeis, dissenting). 
50. It is not so much that the hawks deny such lawlessness as it is their greater 
tolerance of deviations from prescribed behavior: 
There is no question but that over the years there have been police abuses, and 
there will always be police abuses to some degree. Let me suggest to you that 
there is also at the present time a staggering rate of fatalities on the highways-
people being killed by automobiles. If what you want to do is cut out all police 
abuses you can do it by cutting out the interrogation opportunity, at least abuses 
on that particular level. And if you want to cut down and practically eliminate 
automobile fatalities on the highways and the streets in this country, there is an 
easy way to do it: The legislatures can pass laws requiring governors on all 
automobiles so that none can go faster than 20 miles an hour. If you want to pay 
the price for that kind of security, all right. All I am asking is that you know 
what you are getting into. 
Inbau, The Supreme Court's Decisions on Defendants' Rights and Criminal Procedures, 
39 F.R.D. 441, 444 (1966). 
51. The analogy is made unusually clear by a statement of the late Police Chief 
of Los Angeles, William Parker: "[The police] are limited like the Yalu River 
boundary, and the result of it is that they are losing the war just like we lost the 
war in Korea." Transcript of "Are Eavesdropping and Wiretapping Desirable Law 
Enforcement Methods?" presented on NBC's "The Nation's Future," July 8, 1961, 
reprinted in Hearings on S. 1086, S. 1221, S. 1495, and S. 1822 Before the Subcomm. 
on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 
536 (1961). 
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at stake involve far more pressing considerations and that the 
generals of the war must be subject to civilian control.52 Inherent 
in the doves' position is distrust of the domestic army. If Cipes 
could have demonstrated to his readers that the domestic army 
of police has not shown that it can handle unrestrained power 
without damaging the fabric of society, he would have laid a sub-
stantial foundation for the limitations he advocates. After all, police 
lawlessness threatens to undermine the stability of an orderly so-
ciety in a way that no criminal conduct can. Such behavior "de-
stroys the moral authority of the official agencies of society, teaches 
a lesson of lawlessness to the entire community, and provides ex-
cuses and inducements for private citizens tempted to violate the 
law."53 
Recently, Cincinnati Police Chief S. R. Schrotel phrased the 
basic problem as follows: "Among the many countries in which the 
common law prevails, the United States stands first in distrust of its 
police .... The underlying concern seems to be, not the nature of 
the police service, but rather the quality of the police and the man-
ner in which they perform their duties."54 Among the factors which 
have generated such distrust is the recent history of brutality in the 
"interrogation" stage of a criminal investigation;55 another is the 
street encounter between citizens and policemen, which all too fre-
quently involves violence.56 But the major source of distrust is un-
doubtedly the stubborn refusal of the police to abide by the consti-
tutional standards established by the Supreme Court.57 Professor 
Kamisar has pointed out that while law enforcement officials loudly 
Another classic statement of the police position is stated by ex-Police Co=issioner 
Murphy: "To impose upon us unreasonable standards and at the same time extend 
the constitutional safeguards surrounding the individual is akin to requiring one 
boxer to observe the Marquis of Queensbury rules and to permit his opponent to 
gouge, strike foul blows and use every unfair advantage as the referee turns his back." 
Murphy, supra note 24, at 425. 
52. Justice Traynor points out why we need civilian protection: "It is for the 
judges, through the enforcement of judicial rules, to remind law-abiders that courts 
stand not only between them and the excesses of lawbreakers, but also between them 
and the excesses of government." Traynor, supra note 8, at 200. 
53. Allen, supra note 3, at 8. 
54. Schrotel, Social Change and Police Defenses, in NATIONAL SYMPOSIUM ON SCIENCE 
&: CRnnNAL JUSTICE 77, 78 (1966). 
55. See note 27 supra. 
56. Even when the street encounters do not involve actual violence, there is a pat-
tern of massive antagonism. Speaking of such street encounters in Detroit, Judge 
Edwards states: "[The police] tend to view each person [in the heavy crime areas] 
on the street as a potential criminal or enemy, and all too often that attitude is 
reciprocated." Edwards, supra note 7, at 54. 
57. Professor Norris has noted that "[w]e are in a time of crisis now: a constitu-
tional crisis stemming from an indisposition by too many police officers to observe 
the constitution. In time of crisis a democratic society gets its compass and bearing 
from democratic principles. A recognition of the principle of civilian sovereignty is 
necessary now." Morris, supra note IO, at 213. 
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deplore disobedience of society's laws,58 "too many police chiefs and 
prosecutors (and their supporters) have long tolerated, if not en-
couraged, disobedience of our laws and the judgments of our courts, 
which, in their opinion, unduly obstruct them in their pursuit of 
suspected criminals."59 In fact, it was this official inclination for 
disobedience which prompted reluctant appellate courts to adopt 
the exclusionary rules. Chief Justice Traynor, for instance, stated in 
People v. Cahan: 
[W]ithout fear of criminal punishment or other discipline, law en-
forcement officers sworn to support the [federal and state] consti-
tutions, frankly admit their deliberate, flagrant acts in violation of 
both Constitutions and the laws enacted thereunder. It is clearly 
apparent from their testimony that they casually regard such acts 
as nothing more than the performance of their ordinary duties for 
which the city employs and pays them.60 
Thus, if the police themselves are unwilling to respect even the 
minimal standards of our criminal system, they must be carefully 
watched, rather than given more power. In this regard, some discus-
sion by Ci pes of police racism, brutality, and prevarication would 
have been useful. 
Instead of exposing these lawless elements of police conduct, how-
ever, Cipes focuses on the extensive use of informants. While this 
permits him to describe "How They Got Jimmy Hoffa,"61 it hardly 
goes to the crux of police lawlessness, since this procedure has never 
been considered "unlawful" and, in fact, has been clearly upheld 
by the Supreme Court.62 Thus, Cipes' vehement attacks against the 
police on these grounds is somewhat unfair. It is true that using a 
human "bug" to exploit personal relationships raises enormous 
questions in terms of the right to privacy.63 But this productive 
tactic, 64 however offensive and immoral, is still sanctioned by the 
58. "History shows that every society which became lawless soon succumbed, and 
that the first evidences of each society's decay appeared in the toleration of dis-
obedience of its laws and judgments of its courts." Justice Whittaker,. quoted in 
Casper, Call Crime to a Screeching Halt, TRIAL, Oct.-Nov. 1968, at 14. 
59. Kamisar, supra note 1, at 15. 
60. 44 Cal. 2d 434, 437-38, 282 P.2d 905, 907 (1955). 
61. It is probably not fair to blame Mr. Cipes for this provocative lead line, but it 
is printed on the back cover of the dust jacket. 
62. !-!~IFa. v. United States, 385 U.S. 293 (1966). 
63. See Josepno.::-i, Book Review, 15 UCLA L. REv. 1586, 1599-600 (1968). 
64. Cipes himself points out that the FBI attributes 7,500 arrests in one year to 
informants (p. 112). In addition, Cipes rather strains logic when he says: "For a private 
citizen to put a paid informer on the government's payroll is a crime. But five years 
later when Kennedy's men did the same thing in reverse, they committed no crime, 
at least not according to the Supreme Court" (p. 119). Beyond the surface analogy, 
there is a crucial difference between spying to effectuate a crime and spying to detect 
one: society has a significant interest in permitting the latter invasion, and none in 
permitting the former. 
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conscience of the community and is therefore not equivalent to true 
police lawlessness. Offensive behavior by the Government takes on 
an entirely new dimension when such behavior is also illegal. Ac-
cordingly, it probably would have been more meaningful if Cipes 
had dealt to a greater extent with the general problem of police 
lawlessness. 
Furthermore, in view of the purpose of The Crime War, the 
total absence of any reference to Mapp v. Ohio65 and the exclusion-
ary rule is extraordinary. The idea that a guilty man should go free 
as a consequence of police misconduct is not a matter of intuitive 
justice;66 it is a pragmatically designed solution to a serious problem, 
a solution which many people :find shocking.67 Few laymen have any 
conception of the background of Mapp v. Ohio nor do they realize 
how patient the Supreme Court was with blatant and frequent con-
stitutional violations by police. Consequently, it would have been 
useful to show how the rule evolved from the inadequacy of other 
remedies and the out-and-out refusal of law enforcement officials to 
honor the clearest constitutional requirements.68 When seen in its 
proper perspective, Mapp v. Ohio was not a case to protect crim-
inals, but a last-ditch effort to preserve all of the civilized hope 
incorporated in the Bill of Rights, a case to call a halt to police 
lawlessness. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
When one attempts to evaluate a book dealing with a topic of 
great interest to the reviewer, there is a tendency to reproach the 
author for not saying things the reviewer would have said if he had 
written the volume. Although I may have fallen into this trap, I 
65. 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
66. Justice Traynor describes an attitude the exclusionary rule has created: 
[A] known suspect is accused and brought to trial and then thwarts prosecu• 
tion by pleading irregularities in his detection, detention, or trial that compel 
exclusion of convincing evidence of guilt. Perhaps to black out the large failure 
to inquire into the causes of crime, alarmists then rouse the public to righteous 
indignation with a vengeance. Short shrift is made of the likelihood that an 
accused who escapes on procedural rules and not on the merits will in time be 
successfully prosecuted. Instead there is castigation of any court that insists on 
applying rules and procedures consistently, regardless of who is accused. 
Traynor, supra note 8, at 188-89. 
67. Arthur Goldberg explains why many find this procedure shocking. 
We can easily see how the first amendment protects us all. But the rights 
of a suspected criminal seem less personal. His rights are often characterized 
as self-imposed restraints that the law-abiding members of society have adopted only 
out of an exaggerated sense of fair play. And when a confession or illegally seized 
evidence is excluded from a criminal trial, we hear that we cannot afford to 
give such an advantage to the adversary. 
Goldberg, supra note 2, at 666-67. 
68. See Kamisar, On the Tactics of Police-Prosecution Oriented Critics of the 
Courts, supra note 5. 
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believe that my criticisms of The Crime War are somewhat broader. 
The book simply does not hit hard enough in the right places. What 
Cipes is trying to do, however, is very important. There is a great 
need for perspective today; no element of civilized justice is so 
deeply entrenched that it cannot be uprooted during an all-out war 
on crime. Public sympathy and understanding must be invoked, 
not for the criminal suspect, but for the delicate balance of our 
whole legal system. We must not let the instinct for total victory 
cause us to escalate blindly the war on crime. With The Crime War, 
Robert Cipes has made it clear that he intends to fight the propa-
ganda of the hawks. While his book is not likely to convert our 
war-prone society, it will, it is hoped, stimulate discussion and 
further writings. That alone makes the effort worthwhile. 
Michael S. Josephson, 
Assistant Professor of Law, 
Wayne State University 
